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Abstract. It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential
transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals
when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from coun-
terpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism,
i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate
referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals
seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals with possible antecedents
are transparency-preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can
ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactu-
als and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist-friendly explanation for the apparent
validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate
over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals
are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized.
1 Introduction
A linguistic environment φ(x) is said to be transparent if any two coreferring names can
be substituted for x in φ(x) salva veritate; otherwise, φ(x) is said to be opaque. In other




This inference pattern is also known as the substitution of identicals.
Frege [1892] famously pointed out (though not in these terms) that a transparent
environment can be transformed into an opaque environment by embedding it under an
attitude ascription. For example, let P(x) stand for px is a planetq. Intuitively, P(x) is
transparent: for instance, if Hesperus is a planet and Hesperus is Phosphorus, it logically
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(2018). I am grateful for comments received on this paper from Michael Longenecker (at the Central APA),
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follows that Phosphorus is a planet. So where h stands for ‘Hesperus’ and p stands for




Now let Ba stand for pAisha believes thatq. Intuitively, Ba P(x) is opaque: even if Aisha
believes Hesperus is a planet, and even if Hesperus is Phosphorus, it does not logically




The inference is not valid even if we add that Aisha is a perfect logician, since Aisha still
may not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
The main question I want to address in this paper concerns the validity of the sub-
stitution of identicals into counterfactuals. Counterfactuals will generally invalidate the
substitution of identicals when their constituents do. For instance, where ‘’ stands
for the counterfactual conditional, Ba P(h) Ba P(x) is an opaque environment since
Ba P(x) is. But what about the converse? Must a counterfactual validate the substitution
of identicals if its constituents do? And if not always, when? In other words, under what
conditions do counterfactuals preserve the transparency of their constituents?
At first, it seems plausible that counterfactuals always preserve the transparency of
their constituents. After all, consider belief ascriptions. Why is it that belief ascriptions
tend to generate opaque environments? The reason, quite simply, is that belief ascriptions
are at least in part about the way in which we as agents perceive or represent reality—they
are about an agent’s underlying state of mind. So it is not surprising that the truth of a
belief ascription would be sensitive to the representation used to pick out that individual.
But counterfactuals are generally not about the way that mind-independent reality is
perceived or represented (unless, of course, their constituents are). Rather, counterfactuals
are typically concerned with mind-independent reality itself.
The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterfactuals with
metaphysically impossible antecedents, also known as counterpossibles. According to
many of the extant semantic theories of counterfactuals, counterpossibles have trivial
truth conditions.1 On the face of it, though, some counterpossibles seem false. Consider,
for instance, the following counterpossibles:
(Salmon) If my uncle Sam were a salmon, he would have wings.
1To illustrate, take the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, according to which φ ψ is true
just in case (roughly) all of the closest possible φ-worlds are ψ-worlds [Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973]. If φ
is impossible, then there are no possible φ-worlds, and so vacuously all of the closest possible φ-worlds are
ψ-worlds. Hence, on this semantics, ¬◇φ implies φ ψ for any ψ. A similar result holds for the semantic
proposals found in Kratzer 1981, 1989, 2012; Galles and Pearl 1998; Lycan 2001.
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(ConPA) If PAwere able to prove its own consistency, it would be consistent.
(Intuitionism) If intuitionistic logic were correct, logicians would be surprised.
None of these seem obviously true. (Salmon) seems contrary to biology; (ConPA) seems
in opposition to Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem; and while (Intuitionism) may be
true, it seems largely dependent on contingent sociological facts about logicians. So it is
far from obvious that all counterpossibles are trivially true.
Now, let counterpossibilism be the view that some counterpossibles are true and some
are false.2 A well-known argument due to Williamson [2007] (which we review in § 3)
shows that if counterpossibilism is true, then there are counterpossibles with transparent
constituents that do not validate the substitution of identicals. Thus, the question of
whether counterfactuals preserve the transparency of their constituents depends, at least
in part, on whether counterpossibilism is true.
Let us suppose for a moment that counterpossibilism is true, and so a counterfactual
with transparent constituents might fail to be transparent. Even so, counterfactuals appear
to validate the substitution of identicals in a large number of cases. One might wonder,
then, what explains the widespread appearance of validity of the substitution of identicals
into counterfactuals. Since most of the counterexamples seem to involve counterpossibles,
it is natural to explain the apparent validity of the substitution of identicals into counter-
factuals by postulating that counterfactuals with possible antecedents always preserve the
transparency of their constituents.3 This principle is sometimesmotivated by appealing to
the so-called “strangeness of impossibility” constraint, which roughly states that nothing
impossible would have obtained had something possible obtained (§ 3).4
In this paper, I will argue against this counterpossibilist explanation. That is, I will
argue that if counterpossibles can fail to preserve the transparency of their constituents,
then so can counterfactuals with possible antecedents. More specifically, I will argue that
appealing to the possibility of the antecedent (i) cannot explain the apparent validity of
instances of substitution involving counterpossibles (§ 4) and (ii) conflicts with the prin-
ciple of the simplification of disjunctive antecedents (§ 5). If that is right, then explaining
the apparent validity of the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals by restricting
the counterexamples to counterpossibles is problematic.
Some might take this argument to constitute a refutation of counterpossibilism al-
together, since this would seem to deprive the counterpossibilist any way of explaining
the widespread appearance of the validity of the substitution of identicals into counter-
factuals. However, I will propose an alternative counterpossibilist explanation for the
apparent validity of the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals that does not rely
on the modal status of the antecedent of the counterfactual in question and is compati-
ble with the view that counterfactuals are generally opacity-generating (§ 6). This style
of explanation is motivated by an analogy between the behaviors of counterfactuals and
2For a defense of counterpossibilism, also known as “non-vacuism”, see Cohen 1987, 1990; Mares 1997;
Nolan 1997; Goodman 2004; Vander Laan 2004; Krakauer 2012; Bjerring 2013; Brogaard and Salerno 2013;
Kment 2014; Berto et al. 2017. For criticism, see Popper 1959; Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973; Bennett 2003;
Williamson 2007, 2017.
3See, e.g., Brogaard and Salerno [2013]; Berto et al. [2017] for defenses of this approach.
4The name “strangeness of impossibility” comes from Nolan [1997, p. 550].
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attitude ascriptions, and it suggests that the counterpossibilist ought to maintain that all
counterfactuals have a partially epistemic flavor. Thus, I will conclude by arguing that the
debate over counterpossibles is really at its core a debate about whether all counterfactuals
are epistemic (§ 7).
2 Background
To start, let me introduce some notation and some background assumptions that are used
throughout this paper. To clarify the discussion, I will use the following formal language
to regiment a certain natural fragment of English:
φ F P(a1 , . . . , an) | (a1  a2) | ¬φ | (φ ^ φ) | ◻φ | (φ φ) | Ba φ | APKφ,
where a1 , . . . , an are names and P is any n-place predicate. We ignore quantifiers for
simplicity. As usual, we treat the following symbols as defined from the more basic ones:
(a , b) B ¬(a  b) (φ ” ψ) B (φ Ą ψ)^ (ψ Ą φ)
(φ _ ψ) B ¬(¬φ ^ ¬ψ) ◇φ B ¬◻¬φ
(φ Ą ψ) B ¬(φ ^ ¬ψ) APCφ B ¬APK¬φ.
Here is how one should read the operators:◻φ  pit is (metaphysically) necessary that φq◇φ  pit is (metaphysically) possible that φq
φ ψ  pif φ were the case, ψ would be the caseq
Ba φ  pa believes that φq
APKφ  pit is a priori knowable that φq
APCφ  pit is a priori possible (or conceivable) that φq.
We say a formula is atomic if it is either of the form P(a1 , . . . , an) or of the form a1  a2.
We say a formula is modal if it contains at least one of ‘◻’, ‘’, ‘Ba’, and ‘APK’. We say
a formula is counterfactual if it contains ‘’. Finally, we say a formula is epistemic if it
contains one of ‘Ba’ and ‘APK’.
None of our discussionwill depend onwhich semantics for counterfactuals one adopts.
So where Γ is a set of formulas, I will write “Γ ( ψ” for “the argument from premises Γ
to conclusion ψ is valid”, whatever the correct notion of validity is. If Γ  {φ1 , . . . , φn},
we may drop set brackets and write “φ1 , . . . , φn ( ψ” in place of “{φ1 , . . . , φn} ( ψ”.
Furthermore, we may write “( ψ” in place of “H ( ψ”.
If φ is a formula, let φ(x) be the result of replacing any number of names (possibly
none) with the variable x. We will call φ(x) an environment. The formula that results
from replacing every occurrence of x in φ(x) with a name a will be denoted by “φ(a)”.5
We will say an environment φ(x) is transparent if for any names a and b:
φ(a), a  b ( φ(b).
5Note that φ(b) need not be the result of replacing every occurrence of a in φ(a)with b. Rather, only those
instances of ‘a’ represented by ‘x’ in φ(x) are replaced by ‘b’ in φ(b). So φ(x)might contain an occurrence of
‘a’ that is not replaced in φ(b).
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Otherwise, we will say φ(x) is opaque.6
Wewill make some fairly minimal assumptions about the behavior of( that both sides
of the debate can agree on. First, most counterpossibilists are willing to grant the validity
of classical reasoning, at least for the sake of discussion. So I will assumewemay appeal to
classical reasoningwithout harm throughout. Thus, we assume( obeys all of the classical
structural rules (reflexivity, transitivity, weakening, etc.) and rules of inference (modus
ponens, the deduction theorem, adjunction, etc.) and that every substitution instance of a
propositional tautology is valid.
Second, we assume that the usual non-modal laws of identity all hold. That is, we
assume that identity is reflexive and that all predicates (including identity) are transparent:
Self-Identity. ( a  a
Leibniz’s Law. φ(a), a  b ( φ(b) for any atomic φ(x).
These two principles collectively ensure that identity is an equivalence relation. They also
ensure that we are not cheating by sneaking in some opaque environments into modal
claims via opaque predicates.7 By induction, it follows from these two principles that
every non-modal environment is transparent, i.e.,
Transparency of Booleans. φ(a), a  b ( φ(b) for any non-modal φ(x).
Thus, opacity can only arise in modal environments.
Third, we assume that metaphysical necessity is transparency-preserving. To make
this precise, we adopt two principles of necessity that are widely accepted:
Necessity of Identity. a  b ( ◻(a  b) and a , b ( ◻(a , b).8
Necessitation. If φ1 , . . . , φn ( ψ, then ◻φ1 , . . . ,◻φn ( ◻ψ (for n ě 0).
These two principles have some useful consequences. First, by Necessitation, we have:
Possibilization. If φ ( ψ, then◇φ ( ◇ψ.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, if φ(x) is transparent, then ◻φ(x) is too. That is:
Transparency of Necessity. If φ(a), a  b ( φ(b), then ◻φ, a  b ( ◻φ(b).
It follows from Transparency of Booleans and Transparency of Necessity by induction
that φ(a), a  b ( φ(b) if φ is non-epistemic and non-counterfactual.
Using this notation, the principle of the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals
can be stated as follows:
6More generally, where Γ is a set of formulas, we can define φ(x) to be transparent under Γ if Γ, φ(a), a 
b ( φ(b) for all names a and b. All of the substitution principles discussed in this paper could just as well be
generalized to a premise set Γ in this way without loss, though we will not do so for simplicity.
7Potential examples of opaque predicates include px is famousq and px worships yq.
8In Kocurek 2018, I argue against Necessity of Identity. The view I defend also has the consequence that
the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals with possible and transparent constituents fails. This paper
can be seen as an attempt to argue for the plausibility of this consequence even if one wishes to maintain
Necessity of Identity.
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Substitution. φ(a) ψ(a), a  b ( φ(b) ψ(b) if φ(x) and ψ(x) are transparent.
We can define counterpossibilism as the view that rejects the following two principles:
Vacuously True. ¬◇φ ( φ ψ.
Vacuously False. ¬◇φ ( ¬(φ ψ).
That is, according to counterpossibilism, some counterpossibles are true while others are
false.9 We will call the rejection of counterpossibilism in this sense vacuism.
It is worth noting that counterpossibilists sometimes argue that no non-trivial inference
involving counterfactuals is valid.10 Although this claim is often stated at an informal level,
we can articulate it more precisely as follows:
No Counterfactual Logic. If φ1 , . . . , φn ( ψ, then there is a non-counterfactual formula
θ such that ( θ and (φ1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ φn) Ą ψ is the result of uni-
formly substituting some occurrences of 0-ary atomics in θ
with counterfactual formulas.
Informally,No Counterfactual Logic says that for the purposes of validity, counterfactuals
can be treated on a par with propositional atomic formulas. Of course, if that is right, then
the main thesis of this paper is trivial, since Substitutionwill fail for all counterfactuals.
For the purposes of this paper, I will assume thatNo Counterfactual Logic is false and
that there are some interesting purely counterfactual inferences that are valid. While I
think this assumption is justifiable, I do not want to spend much time developing justifi-
cations for it now. But I will note that the reason counterpossibilists accept No Counter-
factual Logic typically has to do with counterpossibles whose antecedents are logically
impossible, also known as counterlogicals. It is highly controversial, even amongst coun-
terpossibilists, whether counterlogicals are non-vacuous or coherent.11 In any case, none
of the counterpossibles dealt with in this paper are counterlogicals. So even if No Coun-
terfactual Logic holds, we might interpret ( to only codify principles of reasoning that
hold in contexts where logical impossibilities are not entertained.
For the most part, we need not take a strong stance on exactly which counterfactual
inferences are valid. Whenever I appeal to a counterfactual inference, Iwill say so explicitly.
The only such inference I will unabashedly appeal to throughout is the following:
Triviality. ( φ φ.
9Strictly speaking, the failure of Vacuously True and Vacuously False only implies that some counter-
possibles are possibly true and others are possibly false. We set aside the “counterpossibilist” view that
counterpossibles are all actually true or all actually false. What is more, this definition of counterpossibilism
leaves it open for counterpossibilists to accept the following vacuity principle:
Vacuous. ¬◇φ ( ◻(φ ψ)_◻¬(φ ψ).
According to Vacuous, every counterpossible is either necessary or impossible, but which it may depend on
its constituents. No one as far as I am aware accepts Vacuous but rejects Vacuously True and Vacuously False.
So throughout, I will ignore the version of counterpossibilism that accepts Vacuous.
10See, e.g., Cohen 1990, p. 131 and Nolan 1997, p. 554.
11For arguments that counterlogicals are vacuous or uninterpretable, see, e.g., Goodman 2004, p. 52 and
Kment 2014, p. 73. For arguments that they are not vacuous, see, e.g., Mares 1997, pp. 517–518, Nolan 1997,
p. 545, and Brogaard and Salerno 2013, p. 643.
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Almost everyone on both sides of the counterpossibles debate accepts Triviality.12 And
in any case, the instances of Triviality I will appeal to will generally be uncontroversial
even for those who reject Triviality.
3 The Explanatory Challenge
We will now briefly review (a) the argument that counterpossibilism implies the failure
of Substitution and (b) the motivation for saving Substitution for counterfactuals with
possible antecedents. We start with an argument due to Williamson [2007, p. 174] that
counterpossibilism implies the failure of Substitution.
Consider the following inference (call this theMain Argument):
(M1) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus would not be Phosphorus.
(M2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(M3) 6 If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Phosphorus would not be Phosphorus.
Schematically, this can be represented in our formal language as follows:
h , p h , p
h  p
6 h , p p , p.
By Necessity of Identity, (M1) and (M3) are counterpossibles. And by Triviality, (M1) is
trivially true. But if any counterpossible is ever false, then surely (M3) is false—or, at the
very least, (M3) could be false.13 If that is right, then the Main Argument is invalid. But
the Main Argument is just an instance of Substitution. So counterpossibilism implies the
failure of Substitution.
At first, this consequence may not seem so bad, since the Main Argument does not
intuitively feel like valid reasoning. But even if we are willing to abandon Substitution,
we still need to explain why most ordinary instances of Substitution at least appear to be
valid. To illustrate, consider the following example also from Williamson 2007 (call this
the Rocket Argument):
(R1) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Hesperus.
(R2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
12It should be noted that Triviality is denied by vacuists who hold that all counterpossibles are vacuously
false, though they will typically maintain a weakened version of Triviality:
Possible Triviality. ◇φ ( φ φ.
It is also, of course, denied by counterpossibilists who maintain No Counterfactual Logic. But even those
counterpossibilists sympathetic to No Counterfactual Logic sometimes make an exception for Triviality
[Nolan, 1997, pp. 554–555]. At no point do I appeal to Triviality to argue against either of these views.
13Many counterpossibilists would argue that (M3) is necessarily false. See, e.g., Krakauer 2012, pp. 76–78,
Bjerring 2013, p. 335, Brogaard and Salerno 2013, pp. 652–653, and Kment 2014, p. 219 for a defense of this
view. For potential problems for this view, see Nolan 1997, p. 550 and Vander Laan 2004, p. 271.
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(R3) 6 If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Phosphorus.
The Rocket Argument seems to be intuitively valid, even if Substitutionmust be rejected.
So if we cannot explain why arguments such as the Rocket Argument generally appear to
be validwithout appeal to Substitution, then thatwould be sufficient grounds for rejecting
counterpossibilism altogether. Call this the explanatory challenge.
Let me pause to clarify what the explanatory challenge to counterpossibilism is. The
problem is not that some (or many) of the instances of substitution into counterfactuals
seem to be reliable forms of reasoning. After all, many fallacious forms of reasoning have
reliable instances.14 For instance, the inference from “This is a left shoe or a right shoe”
and “This is a left shoe” to “This is not a right shoe” is invalid, but generally reliable. In
such cases, however, we can readily explain why the inference is reliable. In this case, the
inference is reliable because left shoes are generally not right shoes. The problem is that the
counterpossibilist does not seem to have any good explanation forwhy the vast majority of
these substitution inferences are reliable. Why are so many instances of substitution into
counterfactuals with transparent constituents reliable if the inference is not universally
valid?
As an analogy, consider the debate over modus ponens. Kolodny and MacFarlane
[2010] argue that, in response to what is now called the miners paradox, we ought to
reject the universal validity of modus ponens (for reasons I will not rehearse here). One
immediate worry for their view, however, is that modus ponens is so essential for practical
and theoretical reasoning that it is difficult to imagine how we could get along without it.
Why is modus ponens such a reliable form of reasoning in such a diverse set of contexts?
What else, besides the universal validity of modus ponens, could explain this?
Their strategy for addressing this problem is to argue that while modus ponens is
not strictly valid, it only fails to be truth-preserving in a very restricted set of circum-
stances. In particular, their semantics predicts that modus ponens is truth-preserving (a)
in categorical contexts (contexts where “one is drawing new conclusions from what one
takes to be known facts” (p. 139)) and (b) in hypothetical contexts, so long as the conse-
quent is information-invariant and the antecedent is eitherworld-invariant or information-
invariant (p. 142). Since most ordinary contexts where modus ponens is employed fall
into one of these two categories, they are able to explain why modus ponens is generally
reliable even if it is not unrestrictedly valid.
The explanatory challenge posed to the counterpossibilists is likewise to give an ex-
planation for why substitution into counterfactuals (with transparent constituents) is gen-
erally reliable if it is not universally valid. This does not mean that they must explain
the apparent validity of every apparently valid instance of Substitution in one fell swoop.
Sometimes, an argument can seem valid due to particular features of the case that have
nothing to do with its logical form (e.g., the shoe inference above seems valid simply be-
cause of certain background facts about shoes). As long as the counterpossibilist is able to
give some (non-circular, non-ad hoc, etc.) explanation for why an instance of Substitution
is safe when it is, they will have met the explanatory challenge posed here.
Since the only known counterexamples to Substitution involve counterpossibles, a
natural suggestion for how to overcome the explanatory challenge would be to maintain
14Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing this point to my attention.
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that Substitution only fails when the counterfactuals involved are counterpossibles.15 If
that is right, then it seems as though we can explain why the substitution of identicals into
counterfactuals appears to be a safe inference in ordinary cases by replacing Substitution
with the following revised principle:
Possible Substitution. φ(a) ψ(a), a  b ,◇φ(a) ( φ(b) ψ(b) if φ(x) and ψ(x) are
transparent.
This principle can be motivated by a kind of conservatism with respect to the orthodox
logic for counterfactuals: the standard counterfactuals inferences need not be rejected in
ordinary circumstances, since in ordinary circumstances, the antecedents of the counter-
factuals involved are metaphysically possible. One way to motivate Possible Substitution
along these lines is to appeal to the following principle:16
Strangeness of Impossibility. ◇φ,◻ψ ( φ ψ.
In words, nothing metaphysically impossible would have obtained had something meta-
physically possible obtained. It turns out that Possible Substitution is actually entailed
by Strangeness of Impossibility, given certain plausible counterfactual principles (see §
A). Thus, one might see Possible Substitution as a special case of a more general principle
that is both plausible and accepted by a number of counterpossibilists.
Given Possible Substitution, we can now explain the apparent validity of many in-
stances of substitution into counterfactuals: those instances generally involve counterfac-
tuals with possible antecedents. The Rocket Argument, for instance, seems valid because
we implicitly assume the premise that the rocket could have continued on its course,
which, if added, would render the argument explicitly valid.17 And inmost contexts, such
an assumption is justified. But the Main Argument seems (and is) invalid because Hes-
perus is necessarily Phosphorus; and so (M1) is a counterpossible, in which case Possible
Substitution does not apply. Thus, one might hope to account for the general reliability
of Substitution by appealing to Possible Substitution.18
15See Brogaard and Salerno 2013, p. 657 and Berto et al. 2017, p. 12 for this approach.
16This principle was introduced by Nolan [1997, p. 550]. The principle is usually stated in terms of the
Lewis-Stalnaker semantics: no impossible world is as close to the actual world as any possible world. For
defenses of this principle, see Mares 1997, pp. 521–522, Kment 2014 and Berto et al. 2017, p. 6. For criticisms,
see Nolan 1997, p. 550, Vander Laan 2004, p. 271, and Bernstein 2016, p. 7.
17Berto et al. [2017, p. 12] argue that while the Rocket Argument is necessarily truth-preserving, it is not
strictly valid, since it does not explicitly include this possibility premise. While considerations surrounding
the semantic paradoxes might give us reason for denying that validity is necessary truth-preservation, such
divergence does not concern us here, since we are assuming the validity of classical logic. Given the validity
of the 5 axiom (◇φĄ◻◇φ), if the rocket could have continued on its course, then it necessarily could have,
and so the Rocket Argument is already necessarily truth-preserving given Possible Substitution. For our
purposes, the issue is moot since I will argue in § 6 that the Rocket Argument is not even truth preserving.
18Williamson [2017, p. 16] has recently argued against this line of defense. His main worry is that the
semantics for counterfactuals endorsed by a counterpossibilist who accepts Possible Substitution will likely
be gerrymandered and disunified:
[For these counterpossibilists,] counterfactuals behave in radically different ways depending
on the modal status of their antecedent: transparently, like a non-epistemic operator, if it is
possible, opaquely, like an epistemic operator, if it is impossible. That suggests an implausibly
hybrid semantics. A more uniform treatment is much to be preferred.
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Unfortunately, there are a variety of problems for this counterpossibilist explanation.
While these problems do not show that Possible Substitution is false, I argue that they do
motivate searching for an alternative explanation for the widespread apparent validity of
substitution inferences into counterfactual environments.
4 Problem 1: Incompleteness
The first problem involves apparently valid instances of Substitution involving counter-
possibles. Not all counterpossibles seem opaque, as the following argument illustrates
(call this the Superman Argument):19
(S1) If Superman and I had the same parents, then I would have had a brother.
(S2) Superman is Clark Kent.
(S3) 6 If Clark Kent and I had the same parents, then I would have had a brother.
Let us suppose, for the sake of discussion, that it is impossible for Superman and I to
have the same parents. (It is straightforward to modify the example if one rejects this.)
Hence, (S1) and (S3) are counterpossibles and so Possible Substitution does not apply
to this argument. Nevertheless, the argument seems valid. So even if we explain the
apparent validity of arguments such as the Rocket Argument using Possible Substitution,
we will still need a further explanation for why many instances of Substitution involving
counterpossibles such as the SupermanArgument seemvalid. Call this the incompleteness
problem.
To be clear, this worry does not call into question Possible Substitution as a principle
of counterfactual resaoning. Though I will raise doubts about Possible Substitution later
(§ 6), we may grant it holds for the sake of argument. The worry is that Possible Substi-
tution does not fully address the explanatory challenge. While the counterpossibilist can
explain the felt validity of instances of Substitution involving counterfactuals with possi-
ble antecedents, that explanation does not account for the Superman Argument, or other
instances of substitution into counterpossibles that seem valid. If the counterpossibilist
cannot supplement Possible Substitution with other plausible principles that explain
why these instances of substitution into counterpossibles seem valid, then explanatory
challenge still stands, and counterpossibilism is still in trouble.
In § 6, I will propose a solution to the explanatory challenge on behalf of the coun-
terpossibilist that avoids the incompleteness problem (one that, as it so happens, will call
into question the solution invoking Possible Substitution). Here, as motivation for that
proposal, I want to consider some natural alternative responses to this problem that appeal
to a priori possibility, and demonstrate their failure.20
Counterpossibilists have in turn responded by proposing what seem to be fairly unified semantic theories
for counterfactuals that both tolerate non-vacuous counterpossibles and validate Possible Substitution. See
Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Berto et al. 2017 for examples.
19This argument comes from Kallestrup [2009, fn. 11].
20Brogaard and Salerno [2013, fn. 11] respond to the incompleteness problem as follows:
Hyperintensional contexts do not always resist substitution even if they sometimes do. Of
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One response to the incompleteness problem is to maintain the epistemic analogue of
Possible Substitution, viz., that substitution is licensed in the scope of counterpossibles
when their antecedents are a priori possible:21
Conceivable Substitution. φ(a) ψ(a), a  b ,APCφ(a),APCφ(b) ( φ(b) ψ(b) if
φ(x) and ψ(x) are transparent.
Since it is a priori possible for Superman and I to have the same parents, Conceivable Sub-
stitution would validate the Superman Argument. Unfortunately, it would also validate
theMainArgument. After all, it is a priori possible that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. Thus,
by Conceivable Substitution, substitution would be licensed in (M1), and thus the Main
Argument would be valid. Hence, if the counterpossibilist wants to reject the validity of
the Main Argument, they cannot endorse Conceivable Substitution.
Here is a more subtle way to explain the validity of the Superman Argument by
appealing to the a priori. Generally, when one makes a counterfactual supposition, one
tries to make as small of a change to the actual world as possible while accommodating
the supposition. While it is notoriously difficult to make this idea precise,22 it is natural to
think that in making a counterfactual supposition, one should preserve as many necessary
truths as is feasible. Of course, counterpossibilism states that one cannot preserve every
necessary truth under counterfactual suppositions that are metaphysically impossible.
Nevertheless, one should still aim to maximize the number of necessary truths that are
preserved under such a supposition. For instance, on the counterfactual supposition that
Superman and I had the same parents, one should maintain (say) that modal realism is
false (assuming it is actually false), since Superman and I having the same parents does
not contradict the falsity of modal realism. More generally, if there is no a priori reason to
reject a necessary truth on a counterfactual supposition, one should hold that necessary
truth fixed. This idea can be codified into a principle as follows:
Minimize Impossibility. ◻ θ,¬APK(φ Ą ¬ θ) ( φ θ.
Now, if ψ(x) is transparent, then a  b ( ◻(ψ(a) Ą ψ(b)). Hence, by Transparency of
Necessity andMinimize Impossibility, we have the following:
a  b ,¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( φ (ψ(a)Ą ψ(b)).
course, we need to give a principled account of when counterfactuals create opaque contexts.
They create opaque context when the antecedent or consequent which result from substituting
one term for another does not follow a priori from the original. Since we are likely to use ‘Clark
Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in such a way as to pick out the same individual, ‘Clark Kent has the
same parents as I do’ is an a priori implication of ‘Superman has the same parents as I do’.
But this response does not look promising: “Clark Kent and I have the same parents” is not an a priori
implication of “Superman and I have the same parents” since it is not an a priori implication of either of these
that Superman is Clark Kent. Moreover, this explanation would imply that the Main Argument is valid by
symmetric considerations. So this cannot be what explains the apparent validity of the Superman Argument.
I suspect the second proposal sketched in this section could be construed as a charitable reconstruction of
their general idea.
21Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to say more about this proposal.
22See, e.g., Goodman 1947; Lewis 1973; Kratzer 2012 for discussion.
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Thus, assuming some plausible counterfactual principles, one can show that Minimize
Impossibility entails the following (see § A for the proof):
A Priori Substitution. φ(a) ψ(a), a  b ,¬APK(φ(a)Ą a , b),¬APK(φ(b)Ą a , b) (
φ(b) ψ(b) if φ(x) and ψ(x) are transparent.
In other words: substitution is licensed into counterfactuals so long as their antecedents
(and substituted instances) are not a priori incompatible with the identity premise. This
principlewould explainwhy the SupermanArgument seemsvalid since neither Superman
and I having the same parents nor Clark Kent and I having the same parents a priori imply
that Superman is not Clark Kent. It is also compatible with the invalidity of the Main
Argument, since the antecedent of (M1) is just the explicit negation of “Hesperus is
Phosphorus”.
In light of Necessity of Identity, A Priori Substitution can also be viewed as an
epistemic analogue of Possible Substitution. One way to formulate Possible Substitution
is as follows:
φ(a) ψ(a), a  b ,¬◻(φ(a)Ą a , b),¬◻(φ(b)Ą a , b) ( φ(b) ψ(b).
Under the assumption that a  b, the additional premises in this inference pattern (viz.,
¬◻(φ(a) Ą a , b) and ¬◻(φ(b) Ą a , b)) are equivalent to the possibility premise (viz.,◇φ(a)) in Possible Substitution. Thus, A Priori Substitution can be viewed as the
epistemic version of this alternative formulation of Possible Substitution. The difference
is that A Priori Substitution is not equivalent to Conceivable Substitution since identity
facts are not generally knowable a priori.23
Unfortunately, while A Priori Substitution does not technically render the Main Ar-
gument valid, it validates a closely related argument. Consider the following slightly
modified version of the Main Argument (call this the Venus Argument):
(V1) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus would not be Phosphorus.
(V2) Hesperus is Venus.
(V3) Venus is Phosphorus.
(V4) 6 If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Phosphorus would not be Phosphorus.
This argument is regimented in our formal language as follows:
h , p h , p
h  v
v  p
6 h , p p , p.
23Specifically, the proof that ◇φ(a) implies ¬◻(φ(a) Ą a , b) relies essentially on Necessity of Identity.
Thus, without the a priori analogue of Necessity of Identity, one cannot show that A Priori Substitution
implies Conceivable Substitution.
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In other words, the Venus Argument is just theMain Argument except we split “Hesperus
is Phosphorus” into two separate identity claims using ‘Venus’. Arguably, if the Main Ar-
gument is invalid, the Venus Argument is not valid either. However, the Venus Argument
is valid if A Priori Substitution holds.
First, notice that if no substitution occurs in the antecedent, then A Priori Substitution
reduces to the following simplified principle:
A Priori Substitution in Consequent. φ ψ(a), a  b ,¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( φ ψ(b)
if ψ(x) is transparent.
Informally: substitution is licensed into the consequents of counterfactuals so long as
their antecedents are not a priori incompatible with the identity claim. Now, the Venus
Argument can be broken up into two parts, each of which is valid if A Priori Substitution
in Consequent holds. The first part involves substitution via the first identity claim (call
this part the Venus Argument Part 1):
(V1) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus would not be Phosphorus.
(V2) Hesperus is Venus.
(V2.5) 6 If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Venus would not be Phosphorus.
Since the claim that Hesperus is not Phosphorus is not a priori incompatible with the claim
that Hesperus is Venus (that is, ¬APK(h , p Ą h , v)), (V2.5) follows from (V1) and (V2)
by A Priori Substitution in Consequent. Using (V2.5), we can now infer our conclusion
(V4) via the following inference (call this part the Venus Argument Part 2):
(V2.5) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Venus would not be Phosphorus.
(V3) Venus is Phosphorus.
(V4) 6 If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Phosphorus would not be Phosphorus.
Again, since the claim that Hesperus is not Phosphorus is not a priori incompatible with
the claim that Venus is Phosphorus (that is, ¬APK(h , p Ą v , p)), (V4) follows from
(V2.5) and (V3) by A Priori Substitution in Consequent. Stitching both parts together, we
obtain the validity of the Venus Argument.
This shows that if the counterpossibilist does not want to accept the validity of the
Venus Argument, they must reject A Priori Substitution in Consequent, and hence A
Priori Substitution. In that case, they cannot appeal to A Priori Substitution to explain
the felt validity of the Superman Argument. An alternative explanation must be sought
for why the Venus Argument is invalid while the Superman Argument seems valid. The
trouble is it is not at all clear what other explanation appealing to the a priori can do both
jobs.
A natural thought to have about the Venus Argument is the following.24 In effect, the
Venus Argument is just an indirect way of implementing the substitution of ‘Hesperus’
with ‘Phosphorus’ in the Main Argument that utilizes two identity claims rather than
24Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.
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one. So perhaps the reason substitution is not licensed is that the antecedent of the
counterfactual premises are incompatible with the all the identity claims used in these
two substitutions taken together. That is, the Venus Argument is invalid because the
antecedent of (V1) (h , p) is a priori incompatible not with either of the identity claims
taken individually (h  v, v  p) but with their conjunction (h  v ^ v  p).
The problem is that it is not clear how this observation can be used to invalidate either
of the two parts of the Venus Argument taken separately. Suppose, just for the sake of
argument, that the counterpossibilist objects to the Venus Argument Part 1. Consider that
part of the argument by itself as its own argument. How does the fact that the antecedent
of (V1) is a priori incompatible with the conjunction of (V2) and some other claim not stated
in the argument explain why the Venus Argument Part 1 is invalid?
Perhaps we can explain this by postulating that substitution is licensed when the an-
tecedent of the counterfactual premise is not a priori incompatiblewith the identity premise
togetherwith the relevant background facts. Since one relevant background fact is the fact
that Venus is Phosphorus, the antecedent of the counterfactual premise (V1), the identity
premise (V2), and the relevant background facts are a priori incompatible. The worry
with this approach, however, is that it inadvertently fails to validate the Superman Argu-
ment. After all, one relevant background fact to consider with regards to the Superman
Argument is the fact that I have such-and-such parents and Clark Kent does not have
those parents. So even here, the antecedent of the counterfactual premise (S1), the identity
premise (S2), and the relevant background facts are a priori incompatible. Thus, I do not see
anyway of spelling out what counts as a “relevant background fact” that simultaneously
invalidates the Venus Argument and explains the felt validity of the Superman Argument.
In sum, it is unclear how the counterpossibilist can appeal to the notion of a priori to
give a complete and general explanation for whymany instances of Substitution involving
counterpossibles seem valid. The complications arising from this approach are far too
great, and, in any case, there is a simpler and more unified solution to the explanatory
challenge at their disposal (one that does away with appeals to Possible Substitution).
Not only is there a worry that the possibility premise in Possible Substitution is an
incomplete answer to the explanatory challenge, there is also a worry that it is an idle one.
Remember, the claim is that the Rocket Argument seems valid because we are implicitly
assuming a missing premise, viz., that the rocket could have continued on its course. This
suggests that if we explicitly deny that premise in the Rocket Argument, the argument
should no longer seem valid. But that does not seem to be the case. Suppose we modify
the Rocket Argument in this way (call this the Impossible Rocket Argument):
(IR1) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Hesperus.
(IR2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(IR3) It is impossible for the rocket to have continued on its course.
(IR4) 6 If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Phosphorus.
Does this argument feel any less valid than the original Rocket Argument? Presumably
not. Both arguments seem equally valid—our intuitions do not seem sensitive to the
possibility of the rocket continuing on its course. But if that is right, then how could we
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possibly explain the felt validity of the Rocket Argument by appealing to the assumption
that the rocket could have continued on its course? It does not seem that we can.
5 Problem 2: Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents
We saw above that using Possible Substitution to explain the felt validity of the Rocket
Argument does not explain the felt validity of arguments like the Superman Argument,
which involve valid substitution into counterpossibles. This is a general problem for any
attempt to simultaneously reject Substitution and explain the felt validity of arguments
such as the Rocket Argument using Possible Substitution.
The next worry is less general than the previous one. In particular, it only applies to
those who accept the Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents:
SDA. ( [(φ _ ψ) θ] ” (φ θ)^ (ψ θ).
Although SDA does not hold on all semantic theories for counterfactuals, many have
found SDA to be a quite plausible counterfactual principle.25 Moreover, there are reasons
for being sympathetic to SDA if one is sympathetic to counterpossibilism. After all,
counterpossibilism implies that counterfactuals are generally representation-sensitive in
the sense that counterfactuals are sensitive to the differences between representations of
an individual. SDA also codifies a kind of representational sensitivity, albeit one of a
slightly different flavor: it tells us that counterfactuals are sensitive to differences in the
logical representations of their antecedents.
Here is the rough idea. Consider the following counterfactual principle:
Replacement. If φ )( φ1, then φ ψ )( φ1  ψ.
It is well-known that SDA and Replacement together entail the following principle:26
Antecedent Strengthening. φ θ ( (φ ^ ψ) θ.
But many find Antecedent Strengthening counterintuitive.27 For example, the following
inference seems invalid:
(K1) If I were a karate master, I would have won the fight.
(K2) 6 If I were a karate master and had broken my leg earlier, I would have won the
fight.
Thus, if onewants to rejectAntecedent Strengthening, then either SDA orReplacement has
to go. In light of this, if one wants to keep SDA, one must admit that counterfactuals are
sensitive to differences in the logical representation of their antecedents. So even though
25For a defense of SDA, see, e.g., Fine 1975, 2012; Nute 1975, 1978; Ellis et al. 1977; Alonso-Ovalle 2006, 2008;
Starr 2014; Santorio Forthcoming. For criticisms, see, e.g., Loewer 1976; Lewis 1977; Mckay and van Inwagen
1977; Warmbro¯d 1981.
26Proof: φ )( φ _ (φ ^ ψ) by classical reasoning, so φ θ )( (φ _ (φ ^ ψ)) θ ( (φ ^ ψ) θ.
27See Lewis 1973. With that said, von Fintel [2001] argues that Antecedent Strengthening is valid when
entailment is interpreted in terms of Strawson entailment. See Gillies 2007; Moss 2012; Lewis 2017 for
discussion.
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the counterpossibilist is committed to a different kind of representational sensitivity for
counterfactuals, it is natural for a counterpossibilist to want to at least be open to the
possibility of maintaining SDA.
Unfortunately, those who accept Possible Substitution but reject Substitution cannot
accept SDA. To see why, consider the following argument (call this the Planet Argument):
(P1) If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus would be the second planet from the
sun.
(P2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(P3) It is possible for Hesperus to be the second planet from the sun.
(PC) 6 If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Phosphorus would be the second planet from
the sun.
Intuitively, if the Main Argument is invalid, then the Planet Argument is also invalid. For
instance, it seems that the premises of the Planet Argument are consistentwith the premise
“If Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus and Phosphorus would not be equidistant
from the sun”; and if we add this premise to the argument, the invalidity of the argument
is even more apparent. However, Possible Substitution and SDA entail that the Planet
Argument is valid.
The reason is simple: if you disjoin an impossible claim and a possible claim, the
resulting disjunction is possible, which one can then employ in simplification inferences.
More precisely, where Sec(x) stands for px is the second planet from the sunq, we have:
(P1) h , p Sec(h) (premise)
(P2) h  p (premise)
(P3) ◇ Sec(h) (premise)
(P4) ◇(h , p _ Sec(h)) (Possibilization, (P3))
(P5) Sec(h) Sec(h) (Triviality)
(P6) (h , p _ Sec(h)) Sec(h) (SDA, (P1), (P5))
(P7) (h , p _ Sec(h)) Sec(p) (Possible Substitution, (P2), (P4), (P6))
(PC) h , p Sec(p) (SDA, (P7))
So if the Planet Argument is invalid, then we must give up either Possible Substitution or
SDA.
Rejecting SDA is not out of the question: SDA is as controversial as a counterfactual
principle gets! So this argument is admittedly not, by any means, a knockdown objection
to Possible Substitution. But it does put the counterpossibilist who uses Possible Sub-
stitution to explain substitution failures in an uncomfortable position. For one thing, as
we noted above, the counterpossibilist has reasons to be sympathetic to SDA given that it
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embodies a kind of representational sensitivity. While they need not adopt SDA, neutrality
would be preferred if the counterpossibilist can achieve it.
Moreover, the conclusion (P7) already seems bad enough. It would already be highly
problematic if the counterpossibilist were committed to the validity of the argument from
(P1)–(P3) to (P7), since even that argument does not seem valid. But note that while
SDA is invoked in deriving (P6), we only use the uncontroversial direction of SDA, viz.,
the right-to-left direction. Even the opponents of SDA agree that this direction of SDA
holds.28 So we do not need the controversial direction of SDA to create problems for
those who explain the apparent validity of Substitution with Possible Substitution: the
uncontroversial direction of SDA already causes problems.
6 A Counterfactual Substitution Principle
In the previous sections, I argued against using Possible Substitution to explain the
apparent validity of the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals. But I do not think
that this is the end of the road for counterpossibilism. In this section, I will sketch a
more unified counterpossibilist explanation that can account for why most instances of
the substitution of identicals in counterfactuals are reliable. On the explanation I propose,
the apparent validity of arguments like the Rocket Argument have nothing to do with the
possibility of their antecedents. In fact, as I explain below, counterfactuals with possible
and transparent constituents may nevertheless fail to be transparent.
To see how the explanation works, it helps to compare counterfactuals with other
opaque environments, such as those involving belief ascriptions. Let us first answer an
easy question: why do belief ascriptions seem to generate opaque environments? For
example, let us assume throughout that Aisha is a perfect logician, believing all the
logical consequences of her beliefs.29 Given this, why does it not follow from the premise
that Aisha believes that Hesperus is a planet together with the premise that Hesperus is





Intuitively, the answer is this: while Hesperus is, in fact, Phosphorus, Aisha might fail
to believe that. Even if Aisha is a perfect logician, she can still fail to believe that Hesperus
is Phosphorus since that fact is only knowable a posteriori. But once we add the premise
28There are some who reject even this direction of SDA, but only for reasons that do not affect the points
made here. For instance, Briggs [2012, p. 156] defends a semantics on which (φ _ ψ) θ is equivalent to
(φ θ)^ (ψ θ)^ (φ ^ ψ θ). If that is right, then we cannot infer (φ _ ψ) θ from φ θ and
ψ θ alone: we must also check that (φ ^ ψ) θ holds. Fortunately, this does not affect our inference
to (P6), since the premise we would need to add, viz., (h , p ^ Sec(h)) Sec(h), is trivially true. So our
application of SDA in inferring (P6) is still licensed, even on this view.
29If needed, the reader is free to interpret the inferences in this section that involve belief ascriptions as
carrying with them an enthymematic premise that Aisha believes the logical consequences of her beliefs.
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that she believes Hesperus is Phosphorus, the argument becomes valid—regardless of
whether Hesperus really is Phosphorus. In other words, while the argument above is




Consider now opaque environments involving a priori knowability claims. Clearly, it is
a priori knowable that if Hesperus is a planet, then Hesperus is a planet. And Hesperus is
Phosphorus. But it does not follow that it is a priori knowable that if Hesperus is a planet,




The reason, again, is simply that it is not a priori knowable that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
If we replaced the premise that Hesperus is Phosphorus with the (false) premise that it
is a priori knowable that Hesperus is Phosphorus, then the resulting argument would be





What I want to suggest is that a counterpossibilist should say the same thing about
counterfactuals. Consider, for instance, the Rocket Argument, which can be formalized
as something like the following (where Cont(x) stands for px continued on its courseq,
Hit(x , y) stands for px hit yq, and r is a name for the rocket):
Cont(r) Hit(r, h)
h  p
6 Cont(r) Hit(r, p).
While this argument might seem valid at first, it implicitly relies on a hidden unstated
premise, viz., that Hesperus would still be Phosphorus had the rocket continued on its
course. Thus, while the argument above is not strictly valid, the following argument is
valid (again, regardless of whether Hesperus is, in fact, Phosphorus):
Cont(r) Hit(r, h)
Cont(r) h  p
6 Cont(r) Hit(r, p).
This idea can be codified more precisely into a (simplified) counterfactual substitu-
tion principle (we will return to the more general version covering substitution in the
antecedents of counterfactuals in a moment):
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Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent. φ ψ(a), φ a  b ( φ ψ(b) if ψ(x)
is transparent.
It is very natural to implicitly assume thismissingpremise (φa  b) inmost substitution
inferences involving counterfactuals—so natural that it is hardly worth stating explicitly.
If the antecedent of a counterfactual is not relevant to the truth of an identity claim that
obtains, then there is no reason to assume that if the antecedent had obtained, the identity
might have failed to obtain. In the Rocket Argument, for example, without any further
information, the rocket’s course does not seem to have anything to do with Hesperus
being Phosphorus. Thus, it seems very plausible to assume that had the rocket continued
on its course, Hesperus would still be Phosphorus. And if we added that premise to
the argument explicitly, Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent would render the
resulting argument valid.
Contrast this with the Main Argument. There, the very first premise is an explicit
denial of the missing premise needed for Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent to
apply, viz., if Hesperus had not been Phosphorus, Hesperus would be Phosphorus. In
other words, to render the Main Argument valid using Counterfactual Substitution in
Consequent, one would have to add an apparently absurd premise of the form φ ¬φ.
So if Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent were the principle underlying these
judgments, we would not expect the Main Argument to sound plausible at all. Similar
reasoning applies to the Venus Argument: the argument is not valid unless we can assume
that if Hesperus were not Phosphorus, Hesperus and Phosphorus would still be Venus,
which seems patently false. Thus, Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent does not
predict the Venus Argument would be (or even seem) valid.
Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent does not imply either Possible Substitu-
tion or A Priori Substitution in Consequent without additional assumptions.30 Nonethe-
less, this missing counterfactual premise (φ a  b) is often (though not always) safe
to assume when the antecedent of the counterfactual is possible—which would explain
why Possible Substitution seemed so natural in the first place. And when the antecedent
is impossible, it is still often (though not always) safe to assume when there is a lack of
an a priori connection between the antecedent and the identity claim—which would ex-
plain the appeal of A Priori Substitution in Consequent. So Counterfactual Substitution
in Consequent seems to capture what was intuitive about these alternative substitution
principles without their costs.
To see that Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent is really what is doing the work
30We could derive Possible Substitution from Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent if the following
holds for all a and b:
a  b ,◇φ ( φ a  b.
Likewise, we could derive A Priori Substitution in Consequent from Counterfactual Substitution in Conse-
quent if the following holds for all a and b:
a  b ,¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( φ a  b.
While these might seem reasonable, arguments such as the Revised Rocket Argument to follow suggest they
are not universally valid. And since A Priori Substitution in Consequent validates the Venus Argument, I
think the plausibility of Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent counts against the principle above.
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in explaining the apparent validity of arguments like the Rocket Argument, it helps to
see how things change when we explicitly deny this hidden premise. Thus, consider the
following argument (call this the Revised Rocket Argument):
(RR1) If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Hesperus.
(RR2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.
(RR3) The rocket could have continued on its course.
(RR4) If the rocket had continued on its course, Hesperus would not be Phosphorus.
(RR5) 6 If the rocket had continued on its course, it would have hit Phosphorus.
Suppose a rocket with a completely accurate map of our entire solar system is heading
towards the object labeled ‘Hesperus’ on its map. On its way, it receives the following
instructions from home base: “Check your database to see whether Hesperus is Phospho-
rus. If Hesperus is not Phosphorus, continue on your course. Otherwise, abort and come
back home.” (We should also say the rocket will go wherever it is instructed to go without
complications—it has plenty of fuel, it is functioning properly, no asteroids are heading
toward it, and so forth.) The rocket checks its database, sees that Hesperus is Phosphorus,
and thus aborts mission and heads back to Earth.
In this scenario, it seems that all of the premises are true, but the conclusion is false.
(RR1) seems true, since the rocketwas alreadyheading towardsHesperus. (RR2) is given as
part of the case. (RR3) is obviously true; after all, it ismetaphysically possible for the rocket
to have received no instructions from headquarters or to have a glitch in the computer,
in which case it would have continued on its course as before. (RR4) seems true, since
the instructions told the rocket to continue on its course if and only if Hesperus was not
Phosphorus. And yet (RR5) seems false: the rocket will continue on its course if and only
if Hesperus is not Phosphorus, and in that case, its trajectory is headed towards Hesperus.
So if the rocket had continued on its course, it would not have hit Phosphorus. Insofar as
one has counterpossibilist intuitions, then, the Revised Rocket Argument argument will
seem intuitively invalid.
One might object that (RR4) cannot possibly be true given the truth of (RR3). If it
is really metaphysically possible for the rocket to continue on its course, then it simply
cannot be true that Hesperus would not be Phosphorus had the rocket continued on its
course. For if (RR4) were true, that would mean that something impossible would have
obtained had something that is possible obtained. Instead, something else would have
had to happen, such as the rocket going on the fritz or getting hit by an asteroid (even
though we tried to stipulate away all such complications).
But notice that this kind of response assumes Strangeness of Impossibility:
Strangeness of Impossibility. ◇φ,◻ψ ( φ ψ.
For in saying that (RR4) must be false, one must rely on the fact that (a) the rocket could
have continued on its course, and (b) necessarily, Hesperus is Phosphorus. Otherwise,
there does not seem to be a principled reason for holding that the premises of the Revised
Rocket Argument could not hold all at once in the scenario described above. And as noted
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in § 3, under plausible counterfactual principles, Strangeness of Impossibility entails Pos-
sible Substitution. So this response would be fine for someone sympathetic to Possible
Substitution. But the question is just whether our commitment to the validity of Possible
Substitution is stronger than the intuition that the Revised Rocket Argument is invalid.
We already saw in the previous sections that maintaining Possible Substitution solely for
the sake of explaining failures of substitution is problematic. So the main independent
motivation for holding on to Possible Substitution in light of this putative counterexam-
ple seems to be a prior commitment to a more general principle such as Strangeness of
Impossibility.
Now is a good time to point out, however, that there are alleged counterexamples to
Strangeness of Impossibility. Consider, for instance:31
(Lewis) If Lewis were right about modality, modal realism would be true.
Supposing modal realism is actually false, it is necessarily false. Moreover, this counter-
factual seems true (whereas “If Lewis were right about modality, modal realism would
be false” does not). But the antecedent of this counterfactual is perfectly possible; Lewis
could have been right about modality—that is, it is metaphysically possible for Lewis to
have had all the correct views onmodality. There is more to say about such an example, of
course, but it at least illustrates that failures of Strangeness of Impossibility are motivated
independently of substitution inferences.32
With all that said,Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent is not quite the full story.
If we want to explain the felt validity of arguments like the Superman Argument, which
31Other counterexamples can be found in Nolan 1997, p. 550 and fn. 21 and Vander Laan 2004, p. 271. It
is worth noting that Vander Laan’s counterexample involves a kind of reductio conditional that some might
think should be viewed as an indicative conditional.
32One common response to this counterexample to Strangeness of Impossibility is that it involves some
kind of scope ambiguity. On a “de re” reading, we hold fixed Lewis’s actual views on modality and are assert
of them that if they were right, modal realism would be true. On a “de dicto” reading, we are saying if the
sentence “Lewis is right about modality” were true, modal realism would be true. The former reading, so the
response goes, is true but a counterpossible, whereas the latter reading is not a counterpossible but is false.
It seems correct that there are multiple ways to interpret (Lewis), some according to which it is true and
others according to which is false. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the claim that there is a scope
ambiguity in (Lewis) is a syntactic claim. It would be more plausible if the antecedent had been phrased with
‘Lewis’s views’, as in “If Lewis’s views about modality were right,. . . ”. But the current phrasing, “If Lewis
were right about modality,. . . ” makes it difficult to maintain that there is a scope ambiguity. The difference
in interpretation is more likely due to context-sensitivity than to an ambiguity.
As an analogy, suppose Aisha is taller than Bart but neither is particularly tall. Now consider:
(Tall) If Bart were tall, Aisha would be tall.
Like (Lewis), (Tall) seems to have two interpretations: one on which it is true (because Aisha is taller than
Bart, so if Bart counts as tall, so does Aisha) and one on which it is false (because Bart’s height doesn’t affect
Aisha’s height). But the difference can hardly be attributed to a scope ambiguity with ‘tall’. A more plausible
explanation of the two different interpretations utilizes the fact that counterfactuals are context-sensitive:
there are multiple ways to satisfy the antecedent by holding fixed different features of the actual world, and
which way of satisfying the antecedent is more salient depends on features of the context. The fact that
the antecedent of (Lewis) has both possible and impossible realizations does not undermine its status as a
counterexample to Strangeness of Impossibility so much as elevate it: it is quite telling that the most natural
interpretation of (Lewis) is one on which the antecedent describes an impossible scenario, even though an
interpretation on which it describes a possible scenario is available.
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involve substituting coreferring names in the antecedent of a counterfactual, we cannot
appeal to Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent, which only concerns substitution
in the consequent of a counterfactual. And this time, we cannot appeal to an analogy with
belief ascriptions or a priori knowability claims, since there is not really an analogue of
substituting coreferring names “in the antecedent” for such environments.
Fortunately, we can still derive a more general substitution principle from Counterfac-
tual Substitution in Consequent using another plausible counterfactual principle, which
is a limited version of the replacement of counterfactually equivalent antecedents:33
Antecedent Replacement. φ(a) ψ, φ(a) φ(b), φ(b) φ(a) ( φ(b) ψ.
But notice that by applying Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent and Triviality,
φ(a) φ(b) follows from:
φ(a) a  b.
Likewise, using the same principles, φ(b) φ(a) follows from:
φ(b) a  b.
Combining these facts together, we get a more general substitution principle along the
following lines:34
33One might try to justify Antecedent Replacement using the following more general principle:
Counterfactual Replacement. φ ψ, φ φ1 , φ1  φ ( φ1  ψ.
I do not want to take a stand on Counterfactual Replacement here. I will simply note that we cannot justify
Antecedent Replacement with Counterfactual Replacement if we want to maintain SDA. For Counterfactual
Replacement together with SDA also entail Antecedent Strengthening, so long as we assume the following:
Counterfactualization. If φ ( ψ, then ( φ ψ.
Since φ ( φ _ (φ ^ ψ), we have ( φ (φ _ (φ ^ ψ)). And since φ ^ ψ ( φ, we have (φ ^ ψ) φ. So
by Triviality and SDA, it follows that ( (φ _ (φ ^ ψ)) φ. Hence, by Counterfactual Replacement and
SDA, φ θ ( (φ_ (φ^ψ)) θ ( (φ^ψ) θ. So we cannot use Counterfactual Replacement to argue
for Antecedent Replacement if we want to also maintain SDA. Still, Antecedent Replacement seems prima facie
plausible even for those who reject Counterfactual Replacement for these reasons.
34Note thatCounterfactual Substitution requires both the antecedent and its substitution to counterfactually
imply the identity claim in order to carry out the substitution. Most of the time, when φ(a) a  b holds,
then so does φ(b) a  b. So the inference is usually safe even with just one of these premises. Problems
arise if we drop either of these premises from Counterfactual Substitution, however. For example, if the
following held for all a and b and all transparent φ(x) and ψ(x):
φ(a) ψ(a), φ(a) a  b ( φ(b) ψ(b),
then one instance of this would be:
a  b θ, a  b a  b ( a  a θ,
which, by Triviality, reduces to:
a  b θ ( a  a θ
But this seems too strong. From the mere fact that if Alfonzo were Borka, he would go skiing, it does not seem
to follow that if Alfonzo were Alfonzo, he would go skiing.
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Counterfactual Substitution. φ(a)ψ(a), φ(a) a  b , φ(b) a  b ( φ(b)ψ(b)
if φ(x) and ψ(x) are transparent.
In the case where no substitution occurs in the antecedent φ, Counterfactual Substitution
reduces to Counterfactual Substitution in Consequent. Again, the additional premises
are very natural to assume in ordinary circumstances. In the Superman Argument, for
example, it is very plausible that had Superman and I had the same parents, Superman
would still have been Clark Kent, and likewise if Clark Kent and I had the same parents.
Thus, the felt validity of such substitution inferences involving counterpossibles can be
vindicated.
So on the one hand, appealing to Possible Substitution to meet the explanatory chal-
lenge seems to raise a number of undesirable complications. Not only does it seem
explanatorily irrelevant, but it seems ill-equipped to handle the incompleteness problem
from § 4 and it conflicts with SDA. By contrast, Counterfactual Substitution seems to
explain the felt validity of substitution inferences involving counterfactuals in a simple,
unified, and elegant way. It faces no obvious incompleteness problem and it does not force
the counterpossibilist to take a stand on SDA. It vindicates the intuitions behind other
substitution inferences such as Possible Substitution and A Priori Substitution without
validating them universally. It does not require (but does not rule out) appealing to a priori
connections when explaining the apparent validity of substitution inferences. It can be
easily integrated intomost hyperintensional frameworks for counterpossibles put forward
in the literature. And, as far as I can see, it faces no devastating counterexamples. There-
fore, I propose the counterpossibilistmeet the explanatory challenge usingCounterfactual
Substitution and simply drop appeal to Possible Substitution altogether.
7 Epistemicizing Counterfactuals
In the previous sections, I argued that serious problems plague anyone who defends
the substitution of identicals into counterfactuals with possible antecedents but rejects
the substitution of identicals into counterpossibles. I argued that the more attractive
alternative is to reject the substitution of identicals even into counterfactuals with possible
antecedents and explain away the apparent validity by appeal to an unstated premise, viz.,
that the identity claim would still hold had the antecedent obtained.
To be clear, nothing I have said thus far settles whether counterpossibilism is true, and
I cannot possibly hope to settle such a debate here. The goal of this paper was simply
to point out the flaws in one counterpossibilist response to the problems surrounding
substitution and to offer a better one. In this final section, I would like to briefly return to
the debate over counterpossibles and to offer a new (albeit tentative) way of viewing that
debate in light of these conclusions about the substitution of identicals.
A common worry that vacuists raise against counterpossibilism is that non-vacuous
counterpossibles threaten our ordinary forms of counterfactual reasoning. If counterpos-
sibilism is true, the thought goes, then many of the mundane forms of counterfactual
reasoning that we thought were acceptable will no longer be valid. It is tempting for
a counterpossibilist to try to reassure those who are compelled by this worry by argu-
ing that counterpossibilism preserves all of the usual counterfactual inferences when the
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antecedents of the counterfactuals involved are possible. This makes it seem as if coun-
terpossibilism is just trying to account for some extreme cases of such reasoning and that
our ordinary forms of counterfactual reasoning are still reliable.
But as we saw, conservatism is not an option for the counterpossibilist. What this
debate over the substitution of identicals reveals is that the counterpossibilist cannot
remain modest with respect to all ordinary forms of counterfactual reasoning. Their
disagreement with orthodoxy goes much deeper than merely how to account for some
special cases of counterfactual reasoning. Rather, the non-vacuity of counterpossibles
reveals that the behavior of counterfactuals is quite analogouswith the behavior of attitude
ascriptions more generally in that both seem sensitive to the way an object is presented
to an agent, not just what object is being presented. In other words, the analogy between
counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions (such as belief reports and a priori knowability
claims) indicates an implicit commitment by the counterpossibilist to a kind of epistemic
view about counterfactuals on which all counterfactuals have an epistemic flavor.
It is well-known that counterfactuals can sometimes be read epistemically rather than
circumstantially (one can replace “circumstantial” with “metaphysical” or “alethic” if
desired).35 Here is a widely-discussed example from Edgington [2008, pp. 16–17] that
illustrates this point:
There is a treasure hunt. The organizer tells me ‘I’ll give you a hint: it’s either
in the attic or the garden.’ Trusting the speaker, I think ‘If it’s not in the attic
it’s in the garden.’ We are competing in pairs: I go to the attic and tip off my
partner to search the garden. I discover the treasure. ‘Why did you tell me to
go to the garden?’ she asks. ‘Because if it hadn’t been in the attic it would have
been in the garden: that’s (what I inferred from) what I was told.’
In this context, the speaker’s response to the question sounds perfectly correct. But notice
that there is a sense in which it might be false. For suppose the person who was in charge
of hiding the treasure did not even know that there was a garden. Then the treasure would
not have been in the garden even if it were not in the attic.
The best way to interpret the speaker’s assertion is epistemically rather than circum-
stantially: what the speaker is roughly trying to say is that if the treasure were not in
the attic, then it would have followed from her evidence that it was in the garden. On
this epistemic interpretation of the counterfactual, what the speaker asserted was correct.
On the circumstantial interpretation, by contrast, what the speaker asserted might not be
correct: if the treasure were not in the attic, it might have been hidden in another location
that the person in charge of hiding the treasure knew about.
This suggests a new proposal about counterpossibles (proposed by Vetter [2016a]):
counterpossibles are only ever non-vacuous on their epistemic reading. On their circum-
stantial reading, the usual semantics for counterfactuals applies, and thus, such counter-
factuals are vacuous. And since charitable conversational partners will generally gravitate
toward non-vacuous non-contradictory readings of a speaker’s utterance, it makes sense
35The label “epistemic” here, which is standard terminology in the literature, might be misleading. It is
not that this interpretation of counterfactuals is connected to one’s knowledge per se. Rather, it is that this
interpretation is connected to one’s information state (or, more broadly, one’s mental state).
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that English speakers would generally gravitate towards the non-vacuous epistemic read-
ings of these counterfactuals over their vacuous circumstantial counterparts. So even
though vacuism is correct insofar as the non-epistemic readings of counterfactuals are
all vacuous, the counterpossibilist is still tracking something genuine, viz., the semantic
non-vacuity of the epistemic reading of counterpossibles.
While this position does not neatly fall into either the vacuist or counterpossibilist
camp, it seems closer in spirit to vacuism than to counterpossibilism.36 It would be en-
tirely unsurprising if the epistemic readings of counterpossibles were not vacuous, since
epistemic environments are generally hyperintensional. So if counterpossibilist grants that
counterpossibles are vacuous on their circumstantial interpretation and only claims that
counterpossibles non-vacuous on their epistemic reading, then their position is a trivial
one. Moreover, the types of arguments vacuist give in favor of their position (e.g., that
counterfactuals are generally not about representations) indicate that the vacuists do not
have an epistemic reading of counterpossibles in mind, and though they disagree with
the soundness of such arguments, counterpossibilists do not think that they are beside
the point. This suggests that the original debate over counterpossibles can be restated
as follows: counterpossibilists think that counterpossibles are generally non-vacuous on
their circumstantial reading, whereas vacuists think that all counterpossibles are vacuous
on that reading. Assuming this is a fair construal of the debate, the position that counter-
possibles are non-vacuous only on their epistemic reading would be a thoroughly vacuist
one. And while the vacuist could deny the existence of an epistemic reading of counter-
factuals, allowing such a reading affords them the benefit of easily explaining away the
counterpossibilist intuitions.
It is controversial whether there really are two separate readings of the counterfactual
as opposed to just one.37 Part of the problem is that if there are two distinct readings of
the counterfactual, then there are not many ways for testing whether or not a particular
counterfactual is to be read circumstantially or epistemically, since the circumstantial
‘would’ does not exhibit many of the normal features circumstantial modals exhibit.38
Vetter [2016a, pp. 17–18] has recently argued that one possible test for determining
whether the intended reading of a counterfactual is epistemic or circumstantial is to see if
the counterfactual obeys the substitution of identicals. If it does not, that suggests that we
are dealing with an epistemic reading of the counterfactual rather than the circumstantial
one. The reason is just the one we noted for thinking counterfactuals are generally trans-
parent in § 1: circumstantial modals not generally about representational features of our
language, but rather about mind-independent reality.
If I am right, however, that counterpossibilists ought to deny that counterfactuals
with possible antecedents are transparency-preserving, then this test cannot be accepted
by counterpossibilists unless they also accept that counterfactuals lack a circumstantial
reading. For if counterfactuals have both readings, and if one maintains that substitution
is licensed on the circumstantial reading, then theMainArgument is valid on that reading.
36Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.
37See, e.g., Veltman 2005, p. 174.
38Vetter [2016b, section 6] outlines some of the reasons why distinguishing between the circumstantial and
epistemic readings of counterfactuals is difficult. For instance, like epistemicmodals, andunlike circumstantial
modals, counterfactuals can scope over tense and aspect.
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In that case, one might start to question whether our intuitions about counterpossibles
on their circumstantial readings are reliable. In addition, if substitution is licensed on
the circumstantial reading of counterfactuals because the way objects are presented is
irrelevant to their truth, then it is not clearwhy the replacement of necessary equivalents (a
principle incompatiblewith counterpossibilism) should not also be licensed. For necessary
equivalents are, in a sense, merely different ways of presenting one and the same state of
affairs.
At first, this might seem to be a problem for counterpossibilism. On the one hand,
this test seems to be a useful guide in general for distinguishing circumstantial and non-
circumstantial modality,39 and is supported by a quite plausible explanation for why
substitution would fail in one case but not another. On the other hand, while it may be
controversial whether there is an epistemic reading of counterfactuals, it is hardly contro-
versial whether there is a circumstantial reading. This seems to put counterpossibilist in a
bind: either reject this quite plausible independently well-motivated test for dinstuishing
circumstantial and epistemic modals, or deny that counterfactuals have a circumstantial
reading at all, neither of which seems very palatable. What I want to suggest in closing is
that, actually, the conclusion that counterfactuals lack a circumstantial reading might not
be so bad.
For one thing, it is far from clear that the differences between the so-called epistemic
and circumstantial interpretations of counterfactuals arises out of two different readings of
the counterfactual conditional. In fact, the hypothesis that there are two readings seems
hard to square with the fact that one cannot apparently in the same breath consistently
assert a counterfactual with one reading and deny the same counterfactual with a different
reading. As a test, suppose you learn that the person who hid the treasure in Edgington’s
example knew nothing of a garden. Does what the speaker said still sound correct? To
my ears, the answer is negative.
An alternative way to explain the difference between the so-called readings is through
context-sensitivity. After all, it is alreadywell-established that counterfactuals are sensitive
to what possibilities are salient in context. To use a classic example from Lewis [1973, pp.
66-67], whether Caesar would have used catapults had he been in command in Korea
depends on what contextually-salient facts about Caesar are being held fixed. Given this,
it is unclear why one could not explain the felt differences between different “readings” of
counterfactuals by appealing to context shifting.
What is more, the thesis that counterfactuals lack a circumstantial reading does not
imply that counterfactuals are about representational features of objects. None of the
counterfactuals discussed in this paper were about representations; they were all about
the world and the objects in it. It is just that, according to counterpossibilism, the truth
conditions of counterfactuals (like the truth conditions of attitude ascriptions) depend on
the particular representation used to represent objects. In otherwords, while the condition
expressed by a counterfactual need not be a condition on representational devices such as
39Here, I am excluding epistemic modals such as ‘might’ and first-person attitude reports, where substitu-
tion inferences seem uniformly valid. For example, “Superman might be powerful; Superman is Clark Kent;
therefore, Clark Kent might be powerful” seems valid. Likewise, “I think Superman is powerful; Superman
is Clark Kent; therefore, I think Clark Kent is powerful” may turn valid under certain conceptions of logical
consequence.
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names, the condition that is expressed by a counterfactual depends on the representational
devices used in stating the counterfactual.
So while the counterpossibilist could maintain the two-readings view of counterfactu-
als and argue that counterpossibles are non-vacuous even on the circumstantial reading,
I think this would be ill-advised. The argument that circumstantial modals validate
the substitution of identicals is fairly compelling. One might even take it as definitional
of circumstantial modality that it not be representation-sensitive. If counterfactuals are
representation-sensitive even on their circumstantial reading, one has to ask where this
sensitivity comes from. By contrast, the counterpossibilist who maintains that coun-
terfactuals only have an epistemic reading do not face such difficult questions. The
representation-sensitivity of counterfactuals arises in a natural way that is analogous
to how it arises in attitude ascriptions.
Some might nevertheless hesitate to accept a view on which counterfactuals lack a cir-
cumstantial reading. If you find yourself in this camp, keep inmind that this claim follows
from the claim that circumstantial modals validate the substitution of identicals and the
claim that counterfactuals generally invalidate the substitution of identicals. The fact that
counterfactuals invalidate the substitution of identicals according to counterpossibilism
shows that counterfactuals have to behave more like epistemic operators than circumstan-
tial ones in that they must be sensitive to modes of presentation and not just to reference.
Indeed, there is some evidence that counterpossibilists themselves already conceive of
counterfactuals in this way.40 Thus, properly understood, I think it is reasonable to think
of the debate over counterpossibles as being closely tied to questions concerning the extent
to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than
previously recognized.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we verify some of the claims that were made in §§ 3–4 regarding entail-
ment relations between various principles of counterfactual reasoning.
First, in § 3, it is claimed that Strangeness of Impossibility entailsPossible Substitution
given certain plausible counterfactual principles. The plausible counterfactual principles
we need for the proof are listed below:
Agglomeration. φ ψ, φ θ ( φ (ψ ^ θ).
Possible Closure. If ψ ( θ, then φ ψ,◇φ ( φ θ.
40For instance, Mares [1997] develops a counterpossibilist semantics where truth is assessed relative to
information states rather than to worlds. Brogaard and Salerno [2013] develop a counterpossibilist semantics
for counterfactuals invoking the notion of an “a priori connection” between propositions. Vander Laan
[2004, pp. 269–271] and Brogaard and Salerno [2013, p. 648] emphasize that while counterpossibles can be
informative, counterfactuals with “unentertainable” suppositions cannot. Thus, counterfactuals are sensitive
to the epistemic or doxastic notion of entertainability as opposed to the metaphysical notion of possibility. On
the other hand, those that generally adopt Strangeness of Impossibility do not like to characterize their view
as “epistemicizing” counterfactuals. Thus, Berto et al. [2017, p. 11] explicitly deny that counterfactuals are
epistemic and also commit themselves to Strangeness of Impossibility (p. 6). See also Kment 2014.
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Fact A.1. Strangeness of Impossibility,Agglomeration, andPossible Closure entail:
Strong Possible Closure. φ ψ,◇φ,◻(ψ Ą θ) ( φ θ.
Proof : First, by Strangeness of Impossibility:
◇φ,◻(ψ Ą θ) ( φ (ψ Ą θ)
So by Agglomeration:
φ ψ,◇φ,◻(ψ Ą θ) ( φ (ψ ^ ψ Ą θ)
Applying Possible Closure to the conclusion, we obtain Strong Possible Closure. ∎
Strong Possible Closure also entails Possible Closure given the principles from § 2.
Fact A.2. Strangeness of Impossibility and Strong Possible Closure entail Possible
Substitution.
Proof : If ψ(x) is transparent, then by Necessity of Identity and Necessitation, we
have:
a  b ( ◻(ψ(a)Ą ψ(b)).
With an application of Strong Possible Closure, we obtain Possible Substitution. ∎
Next, it is claimed in § 4 thatMinimize Impossibility entailsAPriori Substitutiongiven
certain plausible counterfactual principles. The principles we need are Agglomeration
from above, Antecedent Replacement from § 6, and the following principles:
A Priorization. If φ1 , . . . , φn ( ψ, then APKφ1 , . . . ,APKφn ( APKψ.
Conceivable Closure. If ψ ( θ, then φ ψ,APCφ ( φ θ.
Fact A.3. Minimize Impossibility,Agglomeration,APriorization, andConceivable
Closure entail:
A Priori Substitution in Consequent. φ ψ(a), a  b ,¬APK(φĄ a , b) ( φ
ψ(b) if ψ(x) is transparent.
Proof : Since ψ(x) is transparent, we have:
a  b ( ◻(ψ(a)Ą ψ(b)).
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Moreover, by A Priorization, we have:
APK(φ Ą ¬(ψ(a)Ą ψ(b))) ( APK(φ Ą a , b).
By applyingMinimize Impossibility, we obtain:
a  b ,¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( φ (ψ(a)Ą ψ(b)).
Thus, using Agglomeration, it follows that:
φ ψ(a), a  b ,¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( φ (ψ(a)^ (ψ(a)Ą ψ(b))).
Moreover, by A Priorization:
¬APK(φ Ą a , b) ( APCφ.
So by Conceivable Closure, we obtain A Priori Substitution in Consequent. ∎
Fact A.4. A Priori Substitution in Consequent and Antecedent Replacement entail
A Priori Substitution.
Proof : By A Priori Substitution in Consequent and Triviality, we have:
a  b ,¬APK(φ(a)Ą a , b) ( φ(a) φ(b).
Likewise, we have:
a  b ,¬APK(φ(b)Ą a , b) ( φ(b) φ(a).
Putting these together:
a  b ,¬APK(φ(a)Ą a , b),¬APK(φ(b)Ą a , b)
( (φ(a) φ(b))^ (φ(b) φ(a)).
Using an application ofAntecedent Replacement andA Priori Substitution in Con-
sequent, we obtain A Priori Substitution. ∎
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